I, Kenneth Medenbach, am writing to you to explain my positions that eventually led to my involvement in the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Occupation.
Like a lot of people in the early 1990’s I got concerned about our federal government overreach after the Ruby Ridge standoff with Randy Weaver and the murder of his wife and son, the Waco, Texas standoff with David Koresh, and the Branch Davidians, and the murder of more than 80 people. In early 1995 I joined the Central Oregon Regional Militia. We started having meetings. At these meetings I found out how much land the federal government owned in the 12 western states. Over 50% of the 12 western states is owned by the federal government, and in Oregon it is 53%. I had had some previous experience in Oregon courts in relation to my own property issues. I had purchased 5 acres of land Northeast of Crescent, Oregon, sparsely populated, nearest neighbor was 2 miles away. Past the power grid, I thought I could do whatever I wanted. I built a cabin, a greenhouse, a small shop, outhouse, dug a well, I was living the dream until I came home one day and I saw a Stop Work Orders on my buildings. I called the county code enforcer, he told me I had to get a feasibility study, a conditional use permit, a building permit, a mobile home placement permit. I had a bunch of cars and refrigerators and water heaters; cars were for parts, and refrigerators and water heaters were for an earth home I was building and I was charged with accumulation of solid waste. Between permits and fines, it was going to cost me thousands of dollars.
I told the county code enforcer, “This is my property, I own it outright. My nearest neighbor is two miles away. I’m not getting any permits and I’m not going to pay any fines.” The county took me to court, I told them the same thing. They started fining me and continued for the next 5 years. I started thinking “Who’s benefitting from all these laws?” Normally people hire an attorney but I was my own attorney. I started adding it all up and realized that the attorneys are making money. After some research, I found all defense attorneys, prosecuting attorneys and judges all belong to the Oregon State Bar. I found the judicial department are all attorneys and members of the Oregon State Bar, in 1990 15 attorneys were in the State Legislature and were members of the Oregon State Bar and the Governor was an attorney and a member of the Oregon State Bar. At the time there were approximately 12,000 attorneys in Oregon. Then there is the Land Conservation and Development Commission, ‘LCDC’, where more than half of the commissioners are attorneys. So we have attorneys executing the laws in the executive department, we have attorneys passing laws in our legislature and we have defense attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, and judges all members of the Oregon State Bar defending, prosecuting and judging laws. Laws are being executed, judged and legislated for the benefit of attorneys, and the Oregon State Bar.
I filed a complaint in US District Court complaining that the Oregon State Bar was an unconstitutional extension of government. Of course, that judge was a member of the Oregon State Bar and she dismissed my case as frivolous.
Anyways, back to the 53% of Oregon owned by the federal government. In 1995 I lived next door to the BLM, so I decided to put a small cabin on their land. I sent them a letter informing them that I was taking 1 square mile of land by Adverse Possession, on April 18, 1995.
On April 19, 1995 was a tragedy in Oklahoma City, the Alfred Murrah Federal Building was blown up and the BLM became nervous.
The BLM sent me a letter telling me to get off their land, I wouldn’t, I wanted to go to court, knowing there would be a conflict of interest because I had had a complaint filed against the Oregon State Bar, and the judge hearing my case was a member of the Oregon State Bar.
Tensions were pretty high when I went to court, I argued with the judge that he couldn’t hear my case because he was a member of the Oregon State Bar and I had an ongoing cases against the Oregon State Bar thus he was violating my right to due process of law. So I decided I was going to leave the courtroom. At that time I had a warrant for my arrest for driving while suspended. I thought the requirement of a driver’s license was unconstitutional.
Before I could leave the courtroom, US Marshal’s arrested me, handed me over to the State of Oregon, and took me out the back door and was sent to jail.
I was told to stay off of BLM property.
Early in 1996, a militia from Skamania County Washington approached me about how to take federal land by Adverse Possession. I went to Skamania County Washington and tried to explain how to take federal forest land by Adverse Possession, then decided to do it myself. I camped out in the Pinchot Gifford National Forest for 21 days until I was cited and summoned into court. I explained to the court that it did not have jurisdiction and attempted to leave. I was arrested and put in jail for 57 days until trial. The night before the trial, I wrote what I was going to say in court, and prayed and told God it was in his hands. When I went to trial, it was a trial by judge and I told him he took an unconstitutional oath and that the constitution only gave the court the power to support the constitution, not interpret the constitution. I told him Marbury v Madison was wrongly decided and then I sat down and left it in God’s hands and didn’t speak any more.
When the trial was over, I was found guilty, sentenced to time served and released. I went home and decided I wasn’t getting any support from the public and went back to work to make a living. Around 2007, I googled my name into my laptop and found the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision on my case from the Pinchot Gifford National Forest camp out. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited a number of decisions about public lands.
Responding to my challenge to the judge’s oath of office, the Ninth Circuit decided that a federal judge does not have to swear verbatim to support the constitution. It also stated that because I didn’t have any reasoning or case law to support my contention that Marbury v Madison should be overruled, they found my argument had no merit.
In 2014, I re-read Marbury v Madison and found the power to interpret the constitution relies on an unconstitutional oath of office imposed on federal judges by the1789 Judiciary Act. This is my response to the Court of Appeals offering reasoning and legal interpretation to prove that Marbury v Madison was wrongly decided.
OH! and my five acres I was getting fined on. An article came out in the Klamath Falls Herald and News saying that Klamath County had to foreclose on me to get me off of my land. But there was a Homestead Exemption Clause in the Oregon Revised Statutes that requires local governments to pay the landowner $20,000 at the foreclosure sale. I only paid $700 for the 5 acres, nobody is going to pay $20,000 for my five acres. I never heard from the Klamath County Code Enforcer again. There is power in prayer.
“And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.” Romans 8:28
The following is my motion to dismiss, proving the federal government through it's Judicial Department, cannot interpret the constitution.
KENNETH MEDENBACH SWIS#794840
11540 NE Inverness Drive
Portland, OR 97220
Phone: (503) 699-7333
FAX: (503) 345-9372
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 3:16-CR-00051-BR
AMENDED MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORAL MOTION TO DISMISS
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
In its rulings on defendant’s oral motion, this court misconstrued the thrust of defendant’s argument which had been twisted through the government’s grandiloquence and the defendant’s own inexperience in advancing such a motion.
In 1997, in an appeal from a conviction in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, defendant challenged the constitutionality of federal ownership of public lands in Washington State. United States v. Medenbach, 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997). Defendant also argued that since the Constitution does not confer upon federal courts the power of judicial review Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), was wrongly decided. United States v. Medenbach, 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument because defendant failed to offer reasoning or case law to support the argument that Marbury v. Madison should be overruled. Id.
What follows is reasoning and proof that Marbury v Madison must be overruled.
• Congress has required an official oath that is inconsistent with the Constitution.
Article VI, Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution states:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
The Constitution is the “Supreme Law” of the land. In order to support a true union by the people and for the people and to assure that the Constitution remained the Supreme Law of the land, the drafters included in that very document the requirement of an oath before serving the country in an official capacity:
"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to ‘support this Constitution’ but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
Article VI, Sec. 3 of the United States Constitution
These words, inserted when the whole frame of government, with the powers specified, had been adopted by the Constitutional Convention; and it was in that form, and with these powers, that the Constitution was submitted to the We the People, of the several States, for their consideration and decision. The emphatic language of the pledge required is to "support" this Constitution. There is no power more clearly enumerated by the plain language of the Constitution of the United States than this requirement for officials to "support" the Constitution.
The first law statute of the United States of America, enacted in the first session of the First Congress on 1 June 1789, was Statute 1, Chapter 1: an act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths, which established the oath required by civil and military officials to, "support the Constitution." The first oath prescribed by Congress (June 1, 1789) was simply, "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will "support the Constitution of the United States."
It took just one week short of four months before Congress started perverting the Constitution. In the Judiciary Act adopted September 24, 1789, Congress prescribed an unconstitutional second oath of office to United States judicial officers:
“I, , do solemnly swear or affirm that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me according to the best of my abilities understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and the laws of the United States. So help me God.”
See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, Sec.8.
What this court did not previously consider, and what defendant failed to articulate at the motion hearing, was that this unconstitutional oath of “understanding, agreeably”, was central to the Supreme Court’s holding reserving to it the power to interpret the constitution in Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S.137 (1803). The Supreme Court said, "Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime".
If the unconstitutional second oath of office of "understanding, agreeably to the Constitution," had not been established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, Sec.8, it would never have been available to the Supreme Court in 1803 and Marbury v Madison would have never come into existence. According to Marbury v. Madison, the oath by its very nature requires the power of Constitutional interpretation. Because that oath was not consistent with the Constitution in the first place, Marbury was wrongly decided.
• Congress’s attempts to establish an oath have been inconsistent with the Constitution.
In the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act, at 28 USC § 453, Congress replaced the phrase, "according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God," to "under the Constitution." This begs the question of why the oath was changed after nearly 200 years and replaced with another oath no more consistent with the Constitution than the one it replaced.
The legislative history on this statute and its intent is opaque. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, which works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, prepares upon enactment into law, a final public law summary. It stated concerning this provision:
Upon the enactment of replacing "according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God," with "under the Constitution," the Congressional Research Service stated, "This language proved reasonably more effective in tying the decisions of the judiciary to the authority of the United States Constitution."
It appears that Congress intended to force the judiciary to tie its decisions to the Constitution with a revised oath that eliminated the language allowing the courts to extend their authority in an unconstitutional manner. It also suggests that because actions were taken by the courts in an extra-constitutional manner pursuant to an invalid oath, decisions made by the federal courts prior to 1990 are presumptively unconstitutional.
At the same time, since the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act did not cure the unconstitutional flaws in the oath which remains inconsistent with the plain language of the Constitution:
"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to "support" this Constitution..."
Art. VI, Sec. 3 United States Constitution
The plain language of the Constitution dictates that an oath with the language "under the Constitution," is no closer to the correct Constitutional oath to "support the Constitution," than "understanding, agreeably" to the Constitution.
• The federal court’s flawed understanding of the unconstitutionality of the oath and its impact are apparent from the course of defendant’s history in the federal courts.
In United States of America v Medenbach, the Ninth Circuit stated:
"Medenbach argues that the district court judge's oath of office was constitutionally deficient because the statutorily prescribed oath of office set out at 28 U.S.C. § 453 does not mirror the wording of the Constitution itself. The Constitution requires that, "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath of Affirmation, to support this Constitution." (U.S. Const. art.VI, cl. 3). The oath prescribed by statute requires that each federal justice or judge swear to "faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me ... under the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 453. Medenbach argues that the district court judge who presided over Medenbach's bench trial lacked judicial authority because he did not swear to "support" the Constitution, only to perform his duties "under" the Constitution. The Constitution does not require that a judge swear verbatim to "support" the Constitution. Thus, we reject Medenbach' s claim that the district court judge's oath of office was deficient.”
United States v. Medenbach, 116 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997)
The Ninth Circuit’s holding that a judge need not swear verbatim to "support the Constitution" is plainly inconsistent with the language of the Constitution. Because defendant did not have the opportunity for oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, he was never afforded the opportunity to make this argument to that Court.
• Defendant’s literal reading of the oath is supported by Marbury.
In Marbury v Madison, the Supreme Court considered the limited grant of judicial power expressly found in the language of the document as key to understanding its provisions:
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
If it cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, neither the Congress nor the federal courts have the power to ignore the language of the Constitution requiring a specific oath.
For the same reason, the Court was wrong in Medenbach v United States of America Case No. 1:14-cv-641-PA when Judge Panner states, "Plaintiff s claim is wholly insubstantial because the slight difference in wording between the Constitution and the statute providing the oath of office has no legal significance." Nowhere does the Constitution expressly vest in Judge Panner the right to decide that the plain words of the Constitution have no effect. Furthermore, the implication from his holding is that everyone in government has the right to interpret or in this case, disregard, the Constitution.
• Marbury is inconsistent with the language of the Constitution and the right to interpret the Constitution belongs to the people.
The plain language of the Constitution allows and requires only one oath of office to "support the Constitution." Any other oath of office for United States justices and judges, that does not have "support the Constitution" in it, prescribed by Congress and taken by federal judicial officers does not meet the requirements of Article VI, Sec. 3 and the 10th Amendment.
The 10th Amendment, which is never mentioned in Marbury v Madison, states; "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
In Marbury v Madison the Supreme Court unconstitutionally delegated to the judicial department the power to interpret the Constitution when it stated: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,…” Judicial interpretation of the Constitution is not a power delegated to the judicial department by the Constitution. It was a power unlawfully taken from the people without Constitutional authority in violation of the 10th Amendment. Marbury v Madison, as well as United States v. Medenbach were wrongly decided. This United States District Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this case because the Constitution’s plain language does not confer upon federal courts the power of judicial review. See U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 3.
Since all state officers also take an oath to support the Constitution, they are prohibited by the Constitution from interpreting the Constitution. Thus the powers quoted in Marbury v Madison, are reserved to "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, who ordained and established this Constitution for the United States of America."
• The Court and government misunderstood defendant’s argument.
On March 11, 2016 the court rejected defendant’s argument that a second oath required by Congress is unconstitutional. It did so, in part, because of the government’s mischaracterization of the arguments that defendant has raised previously in federal court. The core of defendant’s argument in those cases went to the actual language of the oath’s of office as opposed to a second unconstitutional oath as required by 28 USC § 453.
During the hearing the Court stated:
“Sir, I took the oath, a single oath that's on record….It's not necessary for me to make this point, but I feel I want to communicate to you as an individual. I have in fact, throughout my judicial career, tried every time I had to make a ruling to follow the oath I took -- both as a judge of the circuit court of the state of Oregon and then beginning in 1999, for this court -- to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. Exhibit 1 at 31.
In reviewing the United States Code, it appears that two different statutes require an oath of office, 5 USC § 3331 and the unconstitutional second oath found at 28 USC § 453. The court not address this argument, nor has any other court in contrast to the government’s mischaracterization.
• The oath this Court does not comport with the Constitution.
Since the last hearing, the defendant has obtained a copy of the Oath that this court took. On October 27, 1999, this Court took an oath that was a combination of 28 USC 453 and 5 USC 3331. See Oath of Office, Anna J. Brown U.S. District Court, October 27, 1999 attached as Exhibit 2. The top half of the combination oath is said to be 28 USC 453 but is actually the original oath of office from the Judiciary Act of 1789. 1 Stat. 73, Sec. 8 and relied upon by the Court in Marbury. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). The bottom section of the combination oath is taken verbatim from 5 USC 3331. It states:
“And I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me god.
This oath renders 28 USC 453 or 1 Stat. 73 Sec. 8 void because the Constitution does not allow or require a second oath in relation to the Constitution. Only one oath to “support” the Constitution pursuant to Article 6, Sec. 2 and Article 6, Sec. 3 is allowed or required.
Respectfully submitted on June 8, 2016.
Pro Se Defendant.
And this is my motion to dismiss proving that the federal government cannot own land in the states.
KENNETH MEDENBACH SWIS#794840
11540 NE Inverness Drive
Portland, OR 97220
Phone: (503) 699-7333
FAX: (503) 345-9372
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 3:16-CR-00051-16-BR
AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
Pro se defendant, Kenneth Medenbach, moves the Court to amend his prior Motion to Dismiss (ECF#505). The defendant requests oral argument. The requested amendments are based on newly discovered historical information and legal materials only recently obtained by defendant.
• The scope of other property as that term is used in Article IV, Section 3 has been consistently misinterpreted by the federal courts to include public lands.
In Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution it states:
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United States;…”
The “needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United States” as it relates to territory ceded by individual states to the United States and for purposes of Article IV, Section 3, cl. 2, were established by Congress through the Land Ordinance of 1784, the Land Ordinance of 1785, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, almost all Acts to Establish Territorial Governments in the States, the 19 Organic Acts established by Congress to manage federal lands and even haphazardly in the Oregon Admission Act.
As it relates to territories at the time of the ratification of the United States Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in Section 14, Article 4, states; “no tax shall be imposed on lands [or] the property of the United States;….”
The Ordinance of 1784 Resolution was put into operation by the Ordinance of 1785 by providing a mechanism for selling and settling the land. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 addressed political needs. Following the Ordinance of 1785 Congress eased conditions for sales on credit. Widespread defaults and forfeitures followed. As these defaults and forfeitures were being re-vested in and reverted to the United States, these lands or the property of the United States became territory or other property of the United States, in Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2, that couldn’t be taxed when available for disposal, but could be taxed, once homesteaded.
The needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property” as it relates to Oregon and for the purposes of Article 4 Section 3,
cl. 2, were also established by Congress through the Oregon Territorial Act of 1848:
“AN ACT, To Establish The Territorial Government Of Oregon, . . .
Section 6. And be it further enacted, that the legislative power of the territory, shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States; but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States; nor shall the lands or other property of nonresidents, be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents. All the laws passed by the legislative assembly, shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and if disapproved shall be null and of no effect…
And all such laws, or any law or laws, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall be utterly null and void; and all taxes shall be equal and uniform, and no distinction shall be made in the assessments between different kinds of property, but the assessments shall be according to the value thereof. To avoid improper influences, which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things have no proper relation to each other, “every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.”
For the purposes of the Oregon Territory Act and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution other property means houses, barns, fences and other like structures. In the American West, 57% of the homesteaders made good on their claims allowing them to retain possession of their homestead. Nevertheless a large proportion of homesteaders, 43%, had their lands or other property re-vested in or reverted back to the United States under the Donation Land Claim Act of 1850. It is only these lands or other property that became “Territory” or other property belonging to the United States.
In the Constitution the only place the phrase “other property” appears is in Article 4, Section 3, cl. 2: lands which used to be territory, until homesteaded became lands in relation to other property for taxation purposes. The only thing lands could have been a proper relation to involving taxes, would be houses, barns, fences and other like structures that are taxable. Other property in Article 4 Section 3 Clause 2, can only be houses, barns, fences and other like structures.
The present state of the law is that the Supreme Court decided in 1840 that the phrase other property is public lands. United States v. Gratiot, 39 US 526, 537 (1840):
“The term territory as here used is merely descriptive of one kind of property: and is equivalent to the word lands. And Congress has the same power over it as over any other property belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in Congress without limitation;”
The Supreme Court is wrong. Public lands are not a proper relation to lands or territory. The Constitution does not expressly define the phrase other property. We must go to the Oregon Territorial Act of 1848 to understand the limitations on what “other property is.” We know at the time of the ratification of the Constitution there were no public lands in the States. The only land controlled by the federal government was “Territory” at the time the Constitution was ratified. Houses, barns, fences and other like structures that re-vested in or reverted to the federal government under the Donation Land Claim Act of 1850 are the only other property that is in proper relation to lands or Territory as understood in the Oregon Territorial Act of 1848.
• This definition of other property is inconsistent with intent of the framers to preserve the sovereignty of the States.
“FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES” were paramount to the founding of our Nation according to the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, the Articles of the Confederation states: “Each said State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.” The United States Constitution supports the same ideals in establishing a federal government of limited and enumerated powers. If the Constitution does not delegate that power, the federal government does not have that power.
Our founding fathers would never have imagined that legislation inconsistent to the Constitution over taxing lands and or other property would morph into the federal government owning public lands in the states.
Nothing in the Constitution delegates to the federal government the power to own lands in the States, nor is the power to own lands in the States prohibited by the Constitution to the States, thus the power to own lands in the States is reserved to the States, pursuant to the 10th Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.”
Since this land did not belong to federal government and in fact belonged to the People of the State of Oregon, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over these defendants and this case should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted on June 8, 2016
Pro Se Defendant.